


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OFFICE OF POLICY AND PLANNING
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

NATIONAL AND TACTICAL

INTELLIGENCE

RELATIONSHIP

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NRO, JCS, OSD review(s) completed.

This paper is the first of a series addressing policy issues of interest to the Director of Central Intelligence. It does not represent the coordinated views of the Intelligence Community or the views of the DCI.

NRO, JCS, OSD review(s) completed.


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The national-tactical intelligence relationship has been a source of concern to the Intelligence Community for a number of years. In 1971, the President directed the DCI to assume a more dominant role in respect to tactical intelligence but in 1976, E.O. 11905 stated that the DCI shall have no responsibility for tactical intelligence. The DCI has been uncomfortable with both these directives. Much of the difficulty is inherent in the divergent interests and perspectives of national and tactical intelligence users, but confusion also stems from an inadequate definitional framework. Exclusionary definitions are inappropriate since intelligence can be both national and tactical at the same time. Differentiation between national and tactical intelligence, however, can be made in terms of primary mission, primary purpose, or primary user. Views on how to manage the so called "interface" area vary widely. Some authorities espouse complete separation of tactical from national systems while others argue for a complete integration. As a result, the major organizations concerned with the interface have developed positions that conflict with each other to a large degree. In general, OSD and the JCS have sought to limit DCI involvement in tactical intelligence matters while OMB

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and Congress have pushed for more extensive DCI participation in the area. As a result the DCI has adopted a middle-of-the road position, achieving progress through coordination and negotiation. His concern with the resource allocation and tasking process will continue to involve him in the development of management policy and programmatic review relative to national intelligence collection and production. Hence, he needs to adopt a perspective that embraces all U.S. intelligence activity. In this manner he can functionally relate national, departmental, and tactical intelligence into a conceptual whole. The DCI policy on national-tactical matters should be along the lines described below:

- The DCI is not the appropriate official to provide resource recommendations pertaining to intelligence units and activities that exist for the principal purpose of supporting combat commanders in wartime, or to evaluate their efficiency and effectiveness for wartime missions. He can, however, take advantage of force support units for intelligence in peacetime consistent with their missions and the missions of supported forces.
- The DCI will ensure that national assets are designed and operated to optimize capabilities to provide support, where needed, to tactical intelligence users consistent with the primary national mission purpose.

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- In the context of national-tactical interface, the DCI shall concern himself with tactical intelligence to the extent that: (a) tactical intelligence assets can provide significant national intelligence, (b) tactical intelligence requirements interfere or conflict with national requirements in the tasking of national assets, and (c) tactical intelligence requirements impact on resource allocation in the NFIP.

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
NATIONAL AND TACTICAL
INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIP

PURPOSE


To examine the interface of "national" and "tactical" intelligence with a view toward developing an effective definitional framework and a statement of DCI policy which ensures that intelligence programs of the several intelligence departments and agencies avoid undesirable duplication and uncoordinated overlap and provide adequate intelligence to meet all national security needs.

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INTRODUCTION

1. The national-tactical intelligence interface has been a subject of continuing interest within the Intelligence Community for the past few years. Concern has been expressed over the possible duplication of effort between the several intelligence departments and agencies and the military commands in both the collection and production of intelligence. Categories of intelligence--tactical, strategic, national, warning, etc.--are, for the most part, determined by the intended use. In crisis situations there have been cases where national authorities have made national as well as tactical decisions based on intelligence collected by military tactical assets. Conversely, military commanders have made increasing use in recent years of intelligence provided by national assets. These things have occurred without benefit of an agreed-upon Intelligence Community policy on the matter. Executive Order 11905, issued 19 February 1976, instructed the Committee on Foreign Intelligence to provide guidance on the relationship between tactical and national intelligence, but no such guidance has been developed.

2. Issues which have arisen over the years concern:

- How tactical intelligence support derives from national satellite systems capable of near-real-time operations.

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- Who sets priorities and controls satellite systems in peace, crisis and war.
- What the future mix of satellite systems and tactical intelligence collection capabilities will be.

3. Problems associated with the interface of national and tactical intelligence relate to resource allocation and tasking of intelligence assets and dissemination/exploitation of the product. Such problems can become extremely complex because they involve consideration of the primary missions of these assets, the overlapping nature of intelligence user interests, and the variety of interpretations used by various Community participants as they attempt to resolve these issues. It should also be recognized that the problem embraces more than the DCI and DoD relationship. While the term "national-tactical interface" tends to focus attention on Defense programs, we should be aware that there is a similar dichotomy built into the programs of other agencies, particularly those of the State Department; i.e., we have INR and field reporting agencies, such as embassies, both contributing to national, departmental, and field needs for intelligence.

4. This paper does not address such specific matters as how requirements for improved tactical intelligence

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support by national assets are generated, how national systems mesh with tactical command and control, the vulnerability and survivability of potentially competing systems, costs, the international political implications of using national means of verification for tactical support, conflicts in allocating space system resources, or the impact of security compartmentation. These matters will be considered as part of an interagency study to be conducted later this year. This paper focuses on the broader policy aspects which will serve as a framework within which the more specific issues may be addressed.

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BACKGROUND

5. In late 1971, the President directed the DCI to provide his judgments on the efficiency and effectiveness of all intelligence programs and activities (including tactical intelligence), and to recommend appropriate allocation of intelligence resources. Early in 1972, a draft study was circulated on "U.S. Tactical Intelligence -- A Survey of the Current Situation," which noted the difficulty of defining tactical intelligence activities in such a manner as to reflect general agreement within the Intelligence Community, among intelligence and operational personnel within the Military Services, or among intelligence officials and planning-program-budget review officials. The DCI tried to reconcile the responsibility assigned to him in the Presidential Directive with the statutory responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of Defense and military departments for sizing, organizing and equipping forces for combat readiness. He found it to be impracticable--if not impossible--to make resource recommendations on force support intelligence assets within the limits of his authority and without violating the authority of Defense. In 1973 he was able, however, to forward to the President certain objectives for the Intelligence Community, among which were proposals for rationalizing interaction between national and tactical intelligence activities. At the same time, the DCI proposed to the Secretary of Defense that each appoint a representative to

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assess the scope of the work. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) forwarded the DCI proposal to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and authorized him to appoint a principal DoD representative for purposes of examining the interface between national and tactical intelligence. Subsequently, representatives of the DCI and DoD concluded a Memorandum of Agreement, in which OJCS agreed to identify those tactical intelligence assets to be included in the national-tactical interface evaluation, including those capable of contributing to national requirements.

6. As a follow-on, the DCI then proposed a pilot study which would gauge the essential information needs of the operating commands, would identify the national intelligence assets that could contribute to their satisfaction, and would identify the tactical assets that could contribute to national intelligence. Representatives of the DCI and DoD agreed upon Terms of Reference for an interagency Pilot Study on National Intelligence Support to Field Commanders. While this study was in progress, a National Security Council ad hoc panel on "Tactical Use of National Reconnaissance Assets" issued its preliminary report in mid-1975. It concluded inter alia that national assets should not be considered substitutes for "specialized theater assets now existing or under development" but that the National Reconnaissance Program can provide significant support to theatre military operations. At approximately the same

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time, the Senate Select Committee, Military Intelligence and Technology Task Force, issued a draft report which:

- noted a "legitimate and extensive gray area--in attempting to define military intelligence at the tactical or field command level," and
- recommended that intelligence activities at the tactical/field command level be excluded from the resources to be considered by Congress as an "intelligence budget."

These views were countered later that year when the CIA produced a study titled, "American Intelligence: A Framework for the Future," which concluded that the DCI must, unavoidably, become deeply involved in tactical questions because these questions were thoroughly entangled with national ones--that the field commander could no longer be regarded as an independent entity who must have his own self-contained intelligence apparatus.

7. The joint DCI/JCS Pilot Study on National Intelligence Support to Field Commanders was published in early 1976 and included among its recommendations that:

- Capabilities of certain national intelligence assets be evaluated and tested in joint exercises to determine the extent to which they can support theater intelligence needs.

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- Numerous extant studies which address pieces of national-tactical interface problems be integrated and synthesized before any new or follow-on efforts are undertaken.

JCS review of the pilot study resulted in two actions:

a. A study that will assess all previous and current actions relative to the tactical-national intelligence interface, with the objective of improving intelligence support to operational commanders. This action will be complete in June 1977.

b. Development of a concept for testing national intelligence systems to support tactical requirements in joint exercises and war games. The test plan was approved by the JCS in early December 1976.

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
Emphasis in these exercises was to

provide the national intelligence product to the commander in as realistic a fashion as possible and then assess its utility vis-a-vis tactical assets by measuring its contribution. These exercises did not address potential competition for the resource between the tactical commander at the division level and other divisions, the corps, component or unified commanders, the JCS DoD, and national users. After the


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25X1 DCI noted the problem of using the full capability of national systems in tactical situations in light of the needs of other consumers and priorities. As a result, during the  a national tasking cell was constituted but did not figure prominently in the exercise due to the lack of a contextual scenario.


8. In February 1976, the President issued Executive Order 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," effectively rescinding the Memorandum of 5 November 1971 and excluding tactical intelligence from the responsibilities of both the DCI and the new Committee on Foreign Intelligence. The Order mentioned tactical intelligence in two places. In Section 2, the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) was defined as follows (emphasis added):

National Foreign Intelligence Program means the programs of the Central Intelligence Agency and the special offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs, the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, and those elements of the General Defense Intelligence Program and other programs of the departments and agencies, not including tactical intelligence, designated by the Committee on Foreign Intelligence as part of the program.

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In Section 3, E.O. 11905 stated that the CFI shall:

Provide guidance on the relationship between
tactical and national intelligence; however,
neither the DCI nor the CFI shall have responsibility
for tactical intelligence.

9. Interpretation of the above revealed definitional problems concerning the term "tactical intelligence." In the Section 2 reference, tactical intelligence was defined in terms of capabilities (assets or resources) as opposed to information or use. This distinction was not made clear however in Section 3. In fact, the more logical interpretation of what tactical intelligence means in Section 3 was information or use rather than capabilities, since it is treated separately from the discussion of CFI responsibilities to the NFIP. One interpretation suggested that while the DCI and CFI were not responsible for providing intelligence for tactical commanders or for ensuring that tactical commanders used intelligence wisely or efficiently, they were not exempt from some responsibility for tactical intelligence capabilities. This interpretation seemed to be consistent with the section on the NFIP, since tactical intelligence assets had not been explicitly defined as part of any single departmental or agency program. The CFI was considered the authority which determined what specific assets fit the tactical category.

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DISCUSSION

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DEFINITIONS

11. Much of the difficulty in the national-tactical interface problem stems from definitional ambiguity. The following JCS definitions illustrate the problem:

- a. "Tactical Intelligence--Intelligence which is required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations. Essentially, tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence differ only in scope, point of view, and level of employment."
- b. "Operational Intelligence--Intelligence required for planning and executing all types of operations."
- c. "Strategic Intelligence--Intelligence which is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels."
- d. "National Intelligence--Integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one department or agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency."

Any attempt to fit various intelligence requirements or activities under these separate headings--particularly in periods of crisis--would reveal activities that are tactical, operational, strategic and national all at the same time. Intelligence is not the only area where this is happening. In command and control, when the President can and often does direct in detail what a "tactical" commander does with his forces, it is both a tactical and a national matter.

12. The national-tactical distinction, while becoming blurred in reality, is nonetheless useful for analysis.

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First, it is important to recognize that the national-tactical division, while imprecise, still exists. An examination of assets currently in the NFIP and the Defense Department's intelligence-related category reveals a rough structure where, for example, NRP satellites are clearly national assets and force reconnaissance companies are tactical assets and those in between lie on a continuum, and are pegged on the basis of experience or convenience. In the context of national-tactical intelligence, this spectrum can be viewed from the standpoint of user or purpose and program or control authority. The scope of the national tactical spectrum is outlined in the figure below. Applications indicated in the left hand column are identified with respect to the national-departmental-tactical continuum. Each application has its own distinct spectrum which stretches across the scale. The specific positions used in the figure (e.g., GDIP under Departmental) must be viewed not as discrete points but as generalized overlapping areas of primary coincidence.

	NATIONAL	DEPARTMENTAL	TACTICAL
PURPOSE/	Strategy,	Force Composition	Maneuver, Weapons Employment.
USER	Decision Maker, Policy Maker.	Military Planner,	War Fighter
PROGRAM/ SYSTEM	NRP - CCP	GDIP	Defense Program 1 & 2
TYPE	Satellites	Strategic A/C	Theater Asset

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
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Using this matrix, it can be seen that attache reporting, for example, is "national" from a purpose and user standpoint but "departmental" from a programmatic and control perspective. Similarly, the Defense Support Program is "national" from a control and user view but "tactical" in terms of program and purpose. The implications of the above are such that some have recommended the terms "national and tactical" be abandoned, substituting, e.g., "Local and Global."

^{With}
Using this approach, definitive and useful delineation of functions can be constructed. Local systems are defined as units which:

- Operate in the force profile of the supported commander (i.e., organic).
- Exist to satisfy operational requirements as opposed to intelligence.
- Produce combat information for immediate targeting and/or maneuvering.
- Are interfaced and interact with other operational sensor systems, rather than having their information combined with the output of other systems in the fusion approach used in intelligence analysis (i.e., interaction is real-time; fusion is after the fact).
- Operate under timeliness requirements for reporting within seconds and minutes, as opposed to hours.
- Need to be able to produce locational data which is precise, rather than general.
- Produce information that, in the terms of the intelligence analyst, is unevaluated.

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The Global system, on the other hand, can be generally described as the inverse of the above. It:

- Operates in support of customers ranging from tactical commander to national policy maker;
- Functions primarily in satisfaction of intelligence requirements;
- Is logically managed on a global basis;
- Directs its resources to the crisis or other high priority areas;
- Is a system that must be designed to operate under stress conditions.

But since the major actors in the national-tactical interface area are familiar with and have been conditioned by the national-tactical dichotomy, it seems necessary to retain the existing


13. A significant requirement in defining the terms involves specifying some kind of relationship of NFIP assets to those currently in the Defense Department's Intelligence Related Assets (IRA) category. IRA, which includes tactical and departmental assets, is defined by the JCS as follows:

"Those activities outside the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program (CDIP) which:

- Respond to operational commander's tasking for time-sensitive information on foreign entities;
- Respond to national intelligence community tasking of systems whose primary mission is support of operating forces;

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- Train personnel for intelligence duties;
- Provide an intelligence reserve; or
- Are devoted to research and development of intelligence or related capabilities.

Specifically excluded are programs which are so closely integrated with a weapon system that their primary function is to provide immediate-use targeting data."

14. Definition of terms is therefore both necessary and appropriate in order to discuss differing perceptions and the development of a policy statement on relationships in national-tactical intelligence. The definitions which follow will be useful for purposes of the ensuing discussion.

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a. National Intelligence -

(1) National intelligence is that intelligence required by the President, the National Security Council, and other officials of the United States Government who are involved in formulating and directing the implementation of national security and foreign policy.

(2) National intelligence assets are those which have the primary mission of supporting national policy. A secondary purpose of national assets is to provide support to departmental and/or tactical intelligence needs as capabilities and priorities permit. National intelligence assets transcend the exclusive purview of a single department or agency and are included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program and identified as such.

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b. Departmental Intelligence -

(1) Departmental intelligence is that intelligence any department or agency requires to execute its own mission.

(2) Departmental intelligence assets are those which have the primary mission of supporting the specific mission of a department or agency, e.g., in DoD organizing, equipping, and training military forces. A secondary purpose of departmental assets is to provide support to national and tactical intelligence needs as capabilities and priorities permit. Certain Departmental intelligence assets are included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program and identified as such. Those assets not in the NFIP are identified as departmental intelligence related assets (IRA).

c. Tactical Intelligence -

(1) Tactical intelligence is that intelligence required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations.

(2) Tactical intelligence assets are those which have the primary mission of providing tactical intelligence to a military or field commander. They are integral to the combat organization and directly responsive to the military commander. A secondary purpose of tactical intelligence assets is to provide support to

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departmental and national intelligence needs as capabilities and priorities permit. Because of their unique peacetime training and wartime combat missions, tactical intelligence assets are not included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

15. The key to operational use of these definitions is the authoritative assignment of primary and/or secondary and tertiary missions to each intelligence asset. Assignment of mission primacy, although highly dependent upon scenarios should remain permanently vested in the authority who has the more probable or more important mission. The above definitions take into account two aspects of reality: one deals with current collection and production of intelligence in the functional sense, the other with the allocation of resources to develop or sustain intelligence collection and production capabilities. The terms tasking and resource allocation will be used to distinguish these two facets of the problem in the discussion which follows.

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THREE VIEWPOINTS

16. At least three points of view exist relative to providing guidance based on the relationship between national and tactical intelligence. These range from total separation to complete integration.

- Viewpoint A would see a unified intelligence structure and resource allocation process as a DCI responsibility.

- Viewpoint B would see an interacting relationship between national and tactical assets in both the tasking and resource allocation process but would divide responsibility for the two.

- Viewpoint C would see the total separation of tactical resources from the DCI's responsibility and would exclude tactical assets and capabilities from the NFIP.

17. Viewpoint A was clearly articulated in the November 1971 Presidential directive, "Organization and Management of the US Foreign Intelligence Community," in which the DCI was assigned the following three responsibilities with respect to tactical intelligence (emphasis added):

- a. "I shall look to him (the DCI) to improve the performance of the Community, to provide his judgments on the efficiency and effectiveness of all intelligence programs and activities (including tactical intelligence), and to

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recommend the appropriate allocation of resources to be devoted to intelligence."

- b. "I am directing the Director of Central Intelligence to prepare and submit each year, through OMB, a consolidated intelligence program budget, including tactical intelligence."
- c. "The need to make some savings is so urgent that I have directed the Office of Management and Budget, jointly with the DCI and Secretary of Defense, to review the FY 1973 budget for intelligence and to submit specific reductions from current programs, with particular attention to tactical intelligence."

This view, which by and large represented an OMB position, was the de jure but not de facto mode for addressing national/tactical matters during 1971-1976.

18. Problems developed in this viewpoint stemmed from the basic authorities establishing the responsibility for intelligence within the Executive Branch, i.e., the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and National Security Council Intelligence Directives. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended:

- a. "established under the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence..." "For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security..."
- b. "established a Secretary of Defense as "the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense..." "he has direction, authority, and control over the Department of Defense," and
- c. authorized that "with the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall establish unified or specified combatant commands for the performance of military missions, and shall determine the force

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structure of such combatant commands to be composed of forces..., which shall then be assigned to such combatant commands by the departments concerned for the performance of such military missions.


19. The President, by his 1971 letter, created an apparent conflict between the command authority of the Secretary of Defense, exercised by the commanders of the unified and specified commands, and the responsibility of the DCI to coordinate the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security. In terms of the budget review process, the DCI makes recommendations to the President and defends before Congress the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), which is essentially a compilation of the CIA Program, the State Intelligence Program and the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program (CDIP), the latter being a part of Program 3 of the Defense budget. Viewpoint A would have the DCI review and justify all intelligence-related assets, to include combatant force intelligence units. The DCI, to meet his obligations, would thus provide judgments on the efficiency and effectiveness of all intelligence, and would be the authority to include or remove intelligence and intelligence-related assets from the NFIP and recommend the relative priority for funding.

20. The draft study on "U.S. Tactical Intelligence--A Survey of the Current Situation" previously mentioned, addressed the problem of defining and isolating tactical intelligence

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activities in a manner which has general agreement.

This study concluded that:

- a. The problem of identifying what resources are involved in tactical intelligence cannot be resolved outside of the Department of Defense and should be a responsibility of the Secretary of Defense. Participation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is called for because of the intimate relationship between tactical intelligence resources and the combat readiness of the armed forces.
- b. The role of the Director of Central Intelligence should be to consult with the Secretary of Defense to insure close correlation between national and tactical intelligence activities in the interest of economy in the use of intelligence resources, elimination of any unneeded redundancy and optimum overall utilization of information acquired by either national or tactical intelligence efforts.
- c. Examination of tactical intelligence activities on the part of the Intelligence Community should focus on specific identified issues which can be analyzed in depth. Identification of such issues and initiation of the necessary studies should be a function both of the Director of Central Intelligence and of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Participation in such studies should include representatives, as appropriate, of the DCI, ASD/I, DIA, NSA and the military services.
- d. Whether or in what format a tactical intelligence budget should be identified as part of the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Budget (CDIP) should be determined within the Department of Defense after further study of the issues involved. Until such time as tactical U.S. combat forces actually are

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
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committed, however, any budget separately identified as pertaining to peacetime tactical intelligence activities should be limited to programs which have or can be assigned an active peacetime role in the acquisition, processing, production or dissemination of intelligence -- either tactical or national.

As a result of the study and unresolved definitional problems, such actions as might have been necessary to effectively implement viewpoint A were never undertaken.

21. Viewpoint B recognizes the state of affairs which militates against viewpoint A and tries to make divisions of responsibility and authority as explicit as possible. In developing an understanding of Viewpoint B the following questions represent major concerns:

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- a. How and under what authority does the DCI task tactical intelligence assets to collect/produce national intelligence?
 - b. How and under what authority do tactical commanders task national intelligence assets to collect/produce tactical intelligence?
 - c. How does the DCI evaluate and justify tactical intelligence collection and production capabilities proposed as part of the NFIP?
 - d. How does the DCI evaluate the extent of overlap and duplication between national and tactical assets which have similar capabilities?

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22. In order to focus on these concerns, four examples of current tasking or resource allocation problems have been chosen to illustrate the national-tactical interface issue and the difficulties involved in making distinctions in terms of authority and responsibility.

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
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- c. CROSS PROGRAM - CROSS DISCIPLINE. All four programs require an integrated analysis. For example, a Warsaw Pact attack scenario would have all four resources involved in activities ranging from warning of attack to weapons employment. Each

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would contribute a portion of the total information collected or produced; therefore, each system should be reviewed on its own merits regardless of program or discipline.

24. Viewpoint B looks at the possible resolution of these problems as a practical and beneficial goal. The Pilot Study on National Intelligence Support to Field Commanders, the Electromagnetic Intercept and Position Fixing (IPF) report, the NSC Panel Report on Tactical Use of National Reconnaissance Satellite Assets, and the proposed interagency study to address the matter in a comprehensive manner are manifestations of concern in this area.

25. Viewpoint C would provide a means to more easily define boundaries. Much of the argument against viewpoint A supports viewpoint C. The military establishment views the DCI as serving in a staff capacity as the intelligence advisor to the President and to the NSC. They consider that the Secretary of Defense, as a member of the NSC and a part of the national command authority (DoD definition), is in a line relationship between the President and operational forces in the field. So, too, the Secretary of Defense's subordinates, the CINC's, are in a line relationship. The CINC's functions of command include:

- the composition of subordinate forces
- the assignment of tasks
- the designation of objectives, and

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- the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.

The view that there must be a compelling need for tactical capabilities to be included in a national program is a manifestation of that point of view. Viewpoint C essentially looks at the national-tactical interface in programmatic terms. The determination of primary mission would categorize the assets under review and result in all tactical intelligence assets being removed from consideration as part of the NFIP review. Viewpoint C, however, does not adequately address the tasking problem or its relationship to the effective allocation of resources. Viewpoint C recognizes the bureaucratic factors which make viewpoint A impractical. It recognizes the functional problems that characterize viewpoint B and attempts to make sharp distinctions where possible. It compromises the "big picture" in order to obtain tangible, "real world" gains.

ORGANIZATIONAL POSITIONS

26. Because the solution to the national-tactical interface problem is viewed from these various perspectives, each of the major participants has developed a position which conflicts to some extent with the others. These positions are summarized below.

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27. The Defense View: Many in Defense look at the problem essentially as stated by then Deputy Secretary of Defense Ellsworth in a letter to the House Appropriations Committee.

...we must not try to exert too much control over operational intelligence and intelligence-related programs in ways that could interfere with the needs and priorities of military commanders. Quite frankly, we in intelligence do not understand enough about the tactical needs of military forces to try to second guess our commanders in too much detail. We lack the planning and analytic capability to try to tie every major system together in Washington, or to say to a given field command that his priorities do not seem cost effective.

28. As intelligence buying power has decreased and management interest in the relationship between NFIP and non-NFIP programs and activities has increased, attempts to achieve savings by eliminating needless redundancy and by improving mutual support tend to reinforce strongly held JCS and Service views. Military commanders are skeptical of national intelligence support from national systems in wartime because:

- national needs may take priority over legitimate combat intelligence needs,
- many NFIP systems might not report fast enough for combat support, and
- communications may be inadequate..

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They are also concerned about the identity of intelligence assets which might directly support combat forces. They believe that such assets:

- might be diverted from high priority military missions to respond to national intelligence tasks;
- might be subject to centralized funding, taking from the Services responsibility for resource decisions for them;
- might be traded for national systems incapable of supporting the forces in a timely and usable way, and unresponsive to the combat commanders in the field.

25X1 29. On resource matters, some in Defense believe in an approach that would address national-tactical interface issues on an ad hoc basis and would negotiate on what will and what will not be addressed in the Policy Review Committee arena. For example, with regard to the [redacted] DoD declined to separate tactical from national requirements, [redacted] DoD supported the Defense Dissemination Program as separate and distinct from the NRP program (but still in the NFIP).

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
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30. The CIA View: Concerned primarily with maintaining the integrity of the NFIB, CIA generally wants tactical requirements and objectives as clearly identified as are national requirements and objectives.

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In summary, CIA looks at tactical needs as competitors for funds in the NFIP. Since NFIP collection systems provide mostly national intelligence, they look at proposed add-ons as threatening to other NFIP capabilities.*

31. Congressional View:

a. Congressional concern with national-tactical interface is historic. Major interest was shown this past year as part of both the Senate Select Committee and Joint Congressional Study of the FY 77 budget. The SSC on Intelligence stated:

The SecDef and military services should retain direct control over the operation of tactical military intelligence. Nonetheless, the DCI needs the right to review tactical military operations in order to make budget choices between tactical and national intelligence activities. Moreover, to carry out his coordinating role, the DCI needs to retain control over major technical intelligence collection systems which service both tactical and national intelligence requirements.

In order to carry out his national intelligence responsibilities, the DCI should have the authority to review all foreign and military activities and intelligence resource allocations, including tactical military intelligence which is the responsibility of the Armed Forces.

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b. The Joint Congressional Conference Report on the 1977 budget contained the following:

... just as the local commander is given maximum flexibility in the use of tanks, artillery, and other weapons at his disposal while decisions as to the characteristics of those various weapons are frequently made at higher levels, so also must higher level authorities make decisions about the intelligence-related assets which will be made available to the local commander. As these intelligence-related assets become ever more expensive, complex, and interrelated with strategic intelligence assets, including satellites, it becomes even more crucial that some central control be exercised to prevent overlap and duplication. The conferees do not object to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) and the Director of Central Intelligence sharing this responsibility for review of intelligence-related programs with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other competent military authorities, but the conferees reaffirm that the intelligence-related programs must be subjected to the strong direction which the House Classified Letter on intelligence directed and with which the Senate Classified Letter concurred by implication."

c. The House Appropriations Committee report stated that:

...the Director of Central Intelligence must continue to review these (intelligence-related) programs to prevent duplication between strategic and tactical intelligence assets and to assure that all relevant information gathered at the tactical level is available to national level decision makers.

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For the first time, the Committee also included a section on intelligence-related programs in its classified letter stating that this is to establish the Committee's firm intention to control intelligence related programs to the same degree that it controls intelligence programs.

d. In summarizing the Congressional view, the key points are that:

- (1) DoD should retain operational control over tactical assets.
- (2) Tactical assets should respond to national tasking.
- (3) Some central control should be exercised to prevent overlap and unnecessary duplication.

32. The OMB View: OMB has much the same outlook as Congress. In reviewing the entire budget for the Executive Branch, OMB must compile and relate data from the separate departments and agencies which must be integrated and treated as one budget. For this reason, OMB's concern is somewhat similar to that of the Congress, albeit for a different reason. Congress desires a total budget package that can be attacked as such; OMB requires budget submissions that can be readily integrated into a defensible whole.

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A DCI PERSPECTIVE

33. In formulating his position on national-tactical interface matters, the DCI must take into account the key interests of all members of the Intelligence Community. There is probably no perfect system which he might establish as the final solution to the various problems facing all the interested parties. In the Community, the DCI acts as the first among equals and is responsible for maintaining an efficient forum for providing policy decisions on U.S. intelligence programs. Thus, his perspective must transcend the component programs of the National Foreign Intelligence Program. He must respond to Congressional and OMB demands for a central focus for resource review while, at the same time, permitting control of operational intelligence systems to remain in the hands of the program manager. Recognizing that legitimate differences of opinion exist which are not always easily reconciled, he must, in the end, strive to rise above such obstacles and propose a policy that is in the best interests of the entire Intelligence Community.

34. In developing a DCI policy two major factors need to be considered. One involves better

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definition of the means whereby the DCI can carry out his specific NSC assigned responsibilities. These are:

- a. The DCI shall supervise the production and dissemination of national intelligence and shall develop national intelligence requirements and priorities.
- b. The DCI shall ensure that planning for the utilization of the collection and reporting capabilities for intelligence purposes of each of the several departments and agencies avoids undesirable duplication and uncoordinated overlap and provides adequate coverage for national security purposes. ✓

Concerning the above, it has been pointed out that DCI cognizance must extend to cross-program, cross-discipline matters if he is to be an effective manager. Therefore, he must be able to assess collection, production, and support capabilities individually and in combination in a total U.S. intelligence perspective. In the figure shown on the next page, this view is described (with selected examples included) to demonstrate the scope and totality of the necessary DCI cognizance.

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35. A conceptual framework of this nature for U.S. intelligence permits the DCI to look at cross-program, cross-discipline and cross-mission issues without artificial boundaries. It is important to recognize in this integrated view of U.S. intelligence that the footnote represents a significant caveat. The DCI must ensure that explicit operational control and initial resource commitments remain the sole responsibility of the appropriate commander or manager. Implicit in this vestiture, however, is the existence of a chain of command or authority whereby superiors can approve, modify, or countermand subordinates' directives. This logic leads to a fundamental point in theory -- the NSC is the tasking and resource allocation authority for the U.S. intelligence effort. In this context the DCI could, as appropriate, bring certain matters up for Policy Review Committee (PRC) deliberation, refer other matters to the departments or agencies, or bring certain other issues before OMB or the President.

The development of a policy for national-tactical interface should also consider the diversity of the organizational views noted above. In order to compare policy choices and key viewpoints, the following tables depict expected organizational reactions to various alternatives. While the basis for the development of

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a single "best" policy for the Community may be elusive, it may be assumed that those options acceptable to most interested parties will prove most viable.

TASKING-NATIONAL TO TACTICAL	DEFENSE	CIA	CONGRESS/OMB
DCI has authoritative tasking control over all assets	Anathema to JCS-violates command chain principle	Difficult to effect viable procedures	Responds to expectations for central control
DCI has limited tasking authority over tactical assets	Might be OK if properly caveated	Improves present situation	Recognizes concern to some extent
DCI does not task tactical assets at all	Impacts on justification for certain assets	National Intelligence production would suffer	Flies in face of wish for integrated structure
TASKING-TACTICAL TO NATIONAL			
Authoritative military control is exercised by system or event precipitated, e.g., crisis	Meets goal but procedural implementation problems involved	Major setback to national intelligence primacy	Clean in theory. Looks good on paper
Consolidated, negotiated tasking meeting combined needs (present system)	Does not reduce concern over lack of speed in near real time problem	Continues to avoid decision on who resolves conflicts	Appears to be cumbersome but probably acceptable
Military tactical needs excluded from national tasking	Reverses direction. Would be strongly fought	Potential threats & political problems disappear	Bifurcates rather than centralizes national focus

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RESOURCE ALLOCATION NATIONAL ASSETS	DEFENSE	CIA	CONGRESS/OMB
Tactical capabilities not included in NFIP assets	Does violence to current concept	Saves \$ for national capa- bilities	Makes dividing line clear but maybe too fine
Tactical capabilities included in NFIP assets but separately identified	Could be sup- ported if impetus is to emphasize utility	Meets major objective	Appears pretty much on target
Tactical capabilities included in NFIP but not identified as such	More or less pre- ferred as long as drive for tacti- cal use is sup- ported	Considered unacceptable	Rejects Appropriations Committee direction
RESOURCE ALLOCATION TACTICAL ASSETS			
Include Tactical assets in NFIP	Totally at odds with Defense view	Complicates identification of national assets	Total solution but unwieldy
Exclude Tactical assets from NFIP but DCI review for overlap/duplication	Objected to by some quarters	Major concern is satisfied	Addresses essential concern
Exclude Tactical assets from DCI review	JCS position throughout the years	Further reduces influence	Not responsive to Appropriation Committee guidance

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36. Considering only those acceptable alternatives, a national-tactical interface policy should ensure that:

- the DCI has advisory tasking* authority over tactical intelligence assets.
- Consolidated, negotiated tasking of national assets continue to meet combined national-departmental-tactical needs.
- Tactical capabilities included in NFIP assets are separately identified.
- Tactical capabilities or assets excluded from NFIP receive DCI review for overlap/duplication.

* Advisory tasking -- tasking accepted by an operational commander or controlling authority of an intelligence asset so long as it does not interfere with the primary mission for which that asset was assigned. The effectiveness of the advisory tasking is a matter of concern to many interested in developing a strong DCI position. Advisory tasking will ensure that a mechanism exists to get collection or production requirements to the proper level of Government and will lay the burden of not responding on the shoulders of the appropriate controlling authority. JCS experience indicates that advisory tasking maintains the integrity of the command structure while at the same time providing an effective means of rapid direct tasking to the tactical level. The national tasking nexus (DCI Committees and the NIOs) would have to operationalize this authority through consultation with the appropriate departments and agencies to identify proper addressees and the scope of communications under various scenarios.

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CONCLUSIONS

37. Based on the above analysis, a statement of national-tactical interface policy should assign responsibilities based on DCI views and acceptable alternatives. In general, tasking methods currently in use would remain much the same as present but with the underpinning of Community-agreed-upon DCI guidance as to relative priorities and DCI advisory tasking authority. In the resource allocation area, the DCI would direct NFIP managers to separately identify as appropriate tactical, departmental, and national capabilities for program review and, at the same time, the DCI after consulting with the heads of the appropriate departments and agencies would identify those non-NFIP resources he considered to be subject to comprehensive review. Specific provisions should be as follows:

Policy

(1) The DCI is not the appropriate official to provide resource recommendations pertaining to intelligence units and activities that exist for the principal purpose of supporting combat commanders in wartime, or to evaluate their efficiency and effectiveness for wartime missions. He can, however

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take advantage of force support units for intelligence in peacetime consistent with their missions and the missions of supported forces.

(2) The DCI will ensure that national assets are designed and operated to optimize capabilities to provide support, where needed, to tactical intelligence users consistent with the primary national mission purpose.

(3) In the context of national-tactical interface, the DCI shall concern himself with tactical intelligence to the extent that: a) tactical intelligence assets can provide significant national intelligence, b) tactical intelligence requirements interfere or conflict with national requirements in the tasking of national assets, and c) tactical intelligence requirements impact on resource allocation in the NFIP.

Responsibilities

In consonance with this policy, the following responsibilities are assigned:

(1) The DCI, in developing national intelligence collection requirements, may task tactical intelligence assets on an advisory basis* through the appropriate

* Advisory tasking can be accepted by the operational commander or controlling authority of a tactical asset so long as it does not interfere with the primary mission for which that asset was assigned.

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department or agency, to provide national intelligence. The DCI shall participate in national-tactical testing and exercises to ensure realistic national tasking is part of the scenario.

(2) The DCI will justify national collection resources in the NFIP to the extent that they satisfy national intelligence collection requirements. Justification for additional capabilities in support of tactical requirements will be provided by the departments/agencies concerned.

(3) The DCI will identify those non-NFIP departmental intelligence-related and tactical assets he considers necessary to be reviewed in context of the NFIP because of their tasking and resource allocation relationship to national intelligence requirements and priorities for the collection, production, and dissemination of national intelligence.

(4) The DCI shall review and comment as appropriate on those NFIP resources he identifies as duplicative or overlapping capabilities with departmental and tactical assets, and where national assets can be expected to be tasked to meet departmental and tactical needs. The DCI will identify to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff those non-NFIP intelligence programs which appear

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to be ineffective, inefficient, or unnecessary due to duplication or overlap with NFIP assets.

Procedures


(1) The DCI shall identify those tactical (non-NFIP) resources which he considers to be potentially significant collectors of intelligence useful to the national effort. The controlling authority of these resources will ensure that these assets can and will respond to national advisory tasking on a timely but not to interfere with their primary mission basis. The DCI shall in turn ensure that national assets respond to the needs of tactical users as capabilities and priorities permit.

(2) During the formulation stage of the NFIP budget, the DCI shall identify appropriate systems requirements or capabilities of NFIP assets which he considers to be necessary for national intelligence purposes. At the same time, tactical intelligence systems requirements or capabilities for these NFIP assets shall be identified by the appropriate agency or department.

(3) During the formulation stage of the NFIP budget, the DCI after consulting with the heads of the appropriate departments and agencies, shall identify those departmental, intelligence-related, and tactical assets where possible overlap and unnecessary duplication might exist between or among systems.

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(4) The National Security Council Policy Review Committee will determine the appropriate mix of requirements and capabilities necessary to best meet the combined national, departmental, and tactical needs of the NFIP assets involved.

(5) The Intelligence Community Staff will ensure that the arrangements necessary to accomplish the above are adequate and routinely tested where applicable.

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